BROADENING THE SCIENTIFIC TRADITION:
There has always been a lively debate about the objectives and definitions of science…Part of the problem lies in the misinterpretation by the various antagonists of each others’ positions. Science certainly seeks to move forward on the basis of broad principles, theories, laws and hypotheses, namely statements of interpretation that apply to a broad array of circumstances, and which are subject to continuous scrutiny through experiment, observation, verification and replication. These are proper procedures. They form the basis for both the social and natural sciences. As we have seen, the problem is not so much whether these approaches are necessary, because they are. The issue is whether they should be extended by other forms of judgement and dialogue to create a partnership with society on a broader front. This would allow science to be more aware of its scope for misdirecting human development even when it is sincerely searching for the truth.
Let us look first at the scientific method as it is commonly understood. Science evolves by theory building, theory testing and normative evaluation. The basic theories themselves are examined for their correctness in terms of their internal logicality, and for their consistency, that is their inherent plausibility.
These theories in turn are converted into hypotheses or propositions whose truth or applicability to a given set of circumstances is subjected to analysis. Normally that analysis relies upon observations and meticulous recording; experimentation, also with meticulous recording; or modelling, through which representations of ‘reality’ are created to provide a more manageable basis for examination and prediction. Where there is a historical record, the model can be calibrated against measured output to test its robustness and accuracy. Where there is no historical record, or where the model is essentially designed to depict the future, the only test for reliability is peer group criticism of the model’s assumptions, interactions and sensitivities to relationships between cause and outcome which are uncertain or simply not known.
Peer review is the combined judgement of those who are both knowledgeable and experienced, and who sincerely wish to retain the credibility of their collective profession by maintaining the very highest standards of excellence. This is the vital basis of predictive science. We shall see that the great global change issues—climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, tropical forest removal, microtoxicological disturbance of ecosystems—cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. All are therefore subject to networks of peer scientific review with the aim of generating consensus as a basis for political conviction and action. This prediction is followed for both the social and the natural sciences. For interdisciplinary science the task is more difficult and less successful, but the principle of retaining authoritative professionalism remains.
There is a third aim of science, namely to provide a background of advice as to what is good practice. This is known as its normative role, which can only be conducted through evaluative criteria based on socially agreed norms. Such norms are usually controversial, and certainly ambiguous. They apply to principles of justice fairness, efficiency and whatever else is deemed to be morally right. Clearly the definitions of these principles will vary from political culture to political culture, and will even be disputed by scientists themselves. For example, economists regularly battle over which should have supremacy, efficiency or equity. We shall see...that this is by no means a clear distinction any longer. Politicians prefer to think in terms of fairness or evenness of treatment, even when this means a more costly (i.e., less efficient) solution.
It is wise not to assume that there is a single normative criterion. Different circumstances will throw up varying yardsticks:
Differences between the scientific and environmental policy communities regarding marine environmental protection strategies are discussed in the context of the nature and extent of scientific influence on marine environmental policy. Public perceptions of the nature and severity of marine pollution frequently differ from scientific assessments. The thesis of this paper is that the increasing influence of public perception on marine environmental protection policy is leading to the adoption of simplistic and unnecessarily extreme approaches to marine pollution prevention and to a reduced reliance on science. This trend is illustrated by some recent international developments and some suggestions are made towards enhancing the influence of science on marine protection policy.
CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be a trend towards reduced scientific influence on international mechanisms for improved marine environmental protection. This reflects the increasing influence of public perceptions which has led to the adoption of simplistic and unnecessarily extreme approaches towards preventing pollution such as the drive towards zero discharge and the foreclosure of marine waste disposal options. The fact that these strategies are being adopted with very limited assessment of the adverse effects on other sectors of the environment emphasizes the continued preoccupation with sectoral approaches. The comprehensive long-term protection of the environment, including the marine sector, requires the adoption multisectoral perspectives for the setting of priorities and formulation of action for the prevention of pollution.
Science should lead the way to this broader appreciation of the subject and educating policy makers who are preoccupied with sectoral issues. This can only he done if scientists themselves adopt a broader perspective and point out the dangers involved in the selection of simplistic and short-sighted strategies to the solution of perceived problems. An attempt to forestall political acceptance of extreme attitudes based on non-scientific perception has been made under the “Heidelberg Appeal” that has been signed by several Nobel Laureates and other distinguished scientists.
If we collectively fail to reverse the trend towards the discounting of science in the development of environmental protection measures, we will be both failing our professional responsibilities and risking a further decline in the influence of science on the development and implementation of marine protection measures.
There has always been a lively debate about the objectives and definitions of science…Part of the problem lies in the misinterpretation by the various antagonists of each others’ positions. Science certainly seeks to move forward on the basis of broad principles, theories, laws and hypotheses, namely statements of interpretation that apply to a broad array of circumstances, and which are subject to continuous scrutiny through experiment, observation, verification and replication. These are proper procedures. They form the basis for both the social and natural sciences. As we have seen, the problem is not so much whether these approaches are necessary, because they are. The issue is whether they should be extended by other forms of judgement and dialogue to create a partnership with society on a broader front. This would allow science to be more aware of its scope for misdirecting human development even when it is sincerely searching for the truth.
Let us look first at the scientific method as it is commonly understood. Science evolves by theory building, theory testing and normative evaluation. The basic theories themselves are examined for their correctness in terms of their internal logicality, and for their consistency, that is their inherent plausibility.
These theories in turn are converted into hypotheses or propositions whose truth or applicability to a given set of circumstances is subjected to analysis. Normally that analysis relies upon observations and meticulous recording; experimentation, also with meticulous recording; or modelling, through which representations of ‘reality’ are created to provide a more manageable basis for examination and prediction. Where there is a historical record, the model can be calibrated against measured output to test its robustness and accuracy. Where there is no historical record, or where the model is essentially designed to depict the future, the only test for reliability is peer group criticism of the model’s assumptions, interactions and sensitivities to relationships between cause and outcome which are uncertain or simply not known.
Peer review is the combined judgement of those who are both knowledgeable and experienced, and who sincerely wish to retain the credibility of their collective profession by maintaining the very highest standards of excellence. This is the vital basis of predictive science. We shall see that the great global change issues—climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, tropical forest removal, microtoxicological disturbance of ecosystems—cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. All are therefore subject to networks of peer scientific review with the aim of generating consensus as a basis for political conviction and action. This prediction is followed for both the social and the natural sciences. For interdisciplinary science the task is more difficult and less successful, but the principle of retaining authoritative professionalism remains.
There is a third aim of science, namely to provide a background of advice as to what is good practice. This is known as its normative role, which can only be conducted through evaluative criteria based on socially agreed norms. Such norms are usually controversial, and certainly ambiguous. They apply to principles of justice fairness, efficiency and whatever else is deemed to be morally right. Clearly the definitions of these principles will vary from political culture to political culture, and will even be disputed by scientists themselves. For example, economists regularly battle over which should have supremacy, efficiency or equity. We shall see...that this is by no means a clear distinction any longer. Politicians prefer to think in terms of fairness or evenness of treatment, even when this means a more costly (i.e., less efficient) solution.
It is wise not to assume that there is a single normative criterion. Different circumstances will throw up varying yardsticks:
- Efficiency in the form of least-cost solutions is fine where there is something close to a functioning market which manages to incorporate environmental side effects into price.
- Fairness or equity for all concerned tends to operate where rights are universally shared between present and future generations, and where collective action, usually involving many nation states acting together, is necessary to produce a desired outcome.
- Paying for past debts (i.e., differential equity) is applied for issues such as the clean-up of contaminated land, the reduction of greenhouse emissions (where some countries have emitted over longer periods), and (increasingly) the reallocation of water rights. However, such a norm is very contentious politically; usually those first in, and/or politically the most
powerful, have to be persuaded by the collective weaker (usually victimized) interests to pay up. Yet in modern environmental science this normative principle is an important one. - Equivalence of treatment may not be very costeffective, but it applies to the principle of burden sharing. This is commonly found in circumstances where a number of countries are contributing to environmental degradation, and even when some are creating more damage than others, everyone is expected to pull their weight simply because it is seen as socially responsible and a statement of collective solidarity. In such circumstances, ‘scientific’ justification of contribution and removal is by no means the basis for negotiation. It is primarily a matter of being part of the whole commitment. Such shared action helps to keep all the concerned countries involved.
Differences between the scientific and environmental policy communities regarding marine environmental protection strategies are discussed in the context of the nature and extent of scientific influence on marine environmental policy. Public perceptions of the nature and severity of marine pollution frequently differ from scientific assessments. The thesis of this paper is that the increasing influence of public perception on marine environmental protection policy is leading to the adoption of simplistic and unnecessarily extreme approaches to marine pollution prevention and to a reduced reliance on science. This trend is illustrated by some recent international developments and some suggestions are made towards enhancing the influence of science on marine protection policy.
CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be a trend towards reduced scientific influence on international mechanisms for improved marine environmental protection. This reflects the increasing influence of public perceptions which has led to the adoption of simplistic and unnecessarily extreme approaches towards preventing pollution such as the drive towards zero discharge and the foreclosure of marine waste disposal options. The fact that these strategies are being adopted with very limited assessment of the adverse effects on other sectors of the environment emphasizes the continued preoccupation with sectoral approaches. The comprehensive long-term protection of the environment, including the marine sector, requires the adoption multisectoral perspectives for the setting of priorities and formulation of action for the prevention of pollution.
Science should lead the way to this broader appreciation of the subject and educating policy makers who are preoccupied with sectoral issues. This can only he done if scientists themselves adopt a broader perspective and point out the dangers involved in the selection of simplistic and short-sighted strategies to the solution of perceived problems. An attempt to forestall political acceptance of extreme attitudes based on non-scientific perception has been made under the “Heidelberg Appeal” that has been signed by several Nobel Laureates and other distinguished scientists.
If we collectively fail to reverse the trend towards the discounting of science in the development of environmental protection measures, we will be both failing our professional responsibilities and risking a further decline in the influence of science on the development and implementation of marine protection measures.