The relationship between human life and the environment is obvious. The right to life has been recognized as a fundamental right of a “suprapositive” character in that it is a norm, erga omnes enforceable in respect of all persons, even if there is no treaty obligation. The right to life is included among the peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted. The international instruments and the regional treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 and the Pact of San Jose of 1969 listed it as one of the fundamental rights from which no derogation is allowed. The Human Rights Committee also stated in its General Comment that the right to life “... should not be interpreted narrowly ...” and requires “... that States adopt positive measures...” in order to protect it.
Even if the scope of the intervention of public authorities in order to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights is still subject to debate, it is widely recognized that the States obligations go beyond a passive role and beyond the obligation to abstain from infringing human rights. For example, the right to food, directly linked with the right to life, has been considered as consisting of “... the obligation to respect, which required that the State not destroy existing access to food; the obligation to protect, which required that the States prevent third parties from destroying peoples’ existing access to food; and the obligation to fulfil, which required that the State provide access to adequate food for those for whom such access had not existed.”
The jus cogens nature of the right to life implies that offenders are accountable not only for the deliberate and intentional deprivations of this right but also for failing to take positive measures, including those of a preventive character.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, that the obligation of the States’ Parties to ensure the free exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention implies the duty to organize the governmental apparatus in order to ensure the full
enjoyment of human rights:
“As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights ... and if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from violation.”
Even if the scope of the intervention of public authorities in order to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights is still subject to debate, it is widely recognized that the States obligations go beyond a passive role and beyond the obligation to abstain from infringing human rights. For example, the right to food, directly linked with the right to life, has been considered as consisting of “... the obligation to respect, which required that the State not destroy existing access to food; the obligation to protect, which required that the States prevent third parties from destroying peoples’ existing access to food; and the obligation to fulfil, which required that the State provide access to adequate food for those for whom such access had not existed.”
The jus cogens nature of the right to life implies that offenders are accountable not only for the deliberate and intentional deprivations of this right but also for failing to take positive measures, including those of a preventive character.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, that the obligation of the States’ Parties to ensure the free exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention implies the duty to organize the governmental apparatus in order to ensure the full
enjoyment of human rights:
“As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights ... and if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from violation.”